The Argument for God from Experience: Alston's Epistemological Case

The Experiential Argument for God's Existence

If you have missed the past few posts, here is my argument to date:

Premise 1: Human beings have experiences that evoke a profound sense of dependence, awe, and transcendence (what Schleiermacher calls the feeling of absolute dependence).

Premise 2: These experiences are epistemically significant. Importantly, they constitute non-propositional knowledge.

Premise 3: The depth and universality of these feelings point toward a reality that is non-contingent.

Conclusion: Therefore, the experiences of dependence, awe, and transcendence are not merely psychological but ontological. They invite interpretation of the self as in-relation-to an Ultimate (what theology names God).

So far, I have been focusing on Premises 1 and 2. In my previous blog, I defended Premise 2, exploring tacit knowing as a form of non-propositional knowledge. Today, I seek to further bolster the legitimacy of Premise 2 through reviewing William Alston's epistemological defense of religious experience.

What is Epistemology?

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge: what is knowledge, how do we obtain it, and how do we know what we know.

Core questions explored in epistemology include:

What counts as knowledge? Is knowledge simply 'justified true belief,' or something more?

How is knowledge acquired? Does knowledge come from reason, experience, intuition, revelation, etc.?

What makes belief justified or reliable? Is it coherence with other beliefs, empirical evidence, trust in community, or something else?

Alston's Epistemology of Religious Experience

William Alston (1921-2009) was an American philosopher. He is widely considered to be one of the most important epistemologists and philosophers of religion of the 21st century.

In his landmark work, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Alston lays out his case for religious experience as a rational foundation for belief in God. His central claim is this: Direct experiential awareness of God can serve as a legitimate ground for religious belief.

Alston proposes several ideas in his work. There are 3 I consider to be most important for Premise 2:

1. Mystical Perception: Alston argues people can have genuine perceptual experiences of God, in the same way people perceive physical objects. Alston emphasizes these experiences are not simply emotional states or subjective feelings (see how this idea comports well with Schleiermacher and his explication of the feeling of absolute dependence); rather, Alston claims these to be structured experiences that can inform belief. (1)

   
   

2. Doxastic Practice: This is perhaps Alston's major contribution. He introduces the idea of socially established belief-forming practices. Just as people trust sense perception in everyday life, religious communities have practices for forming beliefs about God, as well. Alston contends that unless proven unreliable, these practices should be considered rational. (2)

3. Epistemic Parity: Finally, Alston challenges the double standard that accepts perceptual beliefs in science but dismisses religious experiences. He contests if sense perception is allowed to justify belief, then mystical perception deserves similar epistemic respect. (3)

In sum, Alston argues for acceptance of religious experience (i.e. the perception of feelings such as dependence, awe, and transcendence) as a valid means of forming beliefs about God.

The Problem of Religious Diversity

Alston anticipates several objections to his core claims. The most substantive, for him, is what he calls the problem of religious diversity. (4) In short, he acknowledges the veracity of religious experience as a suitable ground for belief claims may be called to question given the plurality of incompatible religious doxastic practices. (This is an issue I too address, all-so-ever briefly, in my forthcoming The Death of Supernaturalism: The Case for Process Naturalism.)

Alston does not try to adjudicate between these diverse practices. Ultimately, he believes the existence of diverse mystical traditions doesn't undermine the rationality of engaging any one of them. As he frames it, he claims all are rational if they are: socially established, internally coherent, and not demonstrably unreliable. Interreligious agreement is not a requirement to justify belief.

This is in the same vein as claiming a scientific belief to be rational, even in the midst of conflicting data.

Bringing Some Insights Together

Adding Alston to the conversation provides this blogger a unique and important voice to add to an argument coming from the Center for Faith and Feeling. Whereas I would say Schleiermacher provides the affective grounding for religious experience, and process theology the relational and metaphysical scaffolding, Alston adds a formidable epistemic structure.

Indeed, Alston demonstrates experience to be a legitimate mode of knowing of God's existence.

In my next post, I will continue to explore Alston's work. Importantly, I will draw on some examples Alston uses in his text to compare and contrast the legitimacy in forming beliefs based off perception of substance vs those founded in mystical perception. Stay tuned!

(1) William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 68-101.

(2) Ibid 146-183.

(3) Ibid 68-145.

(4) Ibid 255-285.