Bad Theodicy: Open Theism and the Problem of Evil

In my new book, The Death of Supernaturalism: The Case for Process Naturalism, I detail the growing skepticism around belief in the existence of God. I make the case that atheism will continue to be seen as an attractive alternative to theism as long as the case for belief remains unadapted to modern objections. (1)

Perhaps no issue looms larger than that of the problem of evil. Indeed, evil is no less present, pernicious and perplexing in the modern world than it has ever been.

This blog series is an attempt to review and respond to many of the traditional theistic responses to the problem of evil.

But First, Let's Review

In sum, the typical formulation of the problem of evil goes something like this:

1. If God is omnibenevolent, then God desires to eliminate all evil.

   
   

2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.

   
   

3. Evils occur.

   
   

4. Therefore, God is not omnipotent, not omnibenevolent, or simply does not exist.

My aim is to evaluate each theodicy using two key criteria:

1. Is the response logical (consistent, valid, sound)?

2. Is the response livable (satisfying, applicable, practical)?

In my last post, I evaluated William Lane Craig's molinism, finding neither logical nor livable.

Today, I will turn to the theodicy of open theism, represented most prolifically by Clark Pinnock, Gregory Boyd, and William Hasker.

What is Open Theism?

Open theism is a theological view born in 1994 (at least in name, proponents would say its ideas span back to biblical times) out of the landmark book, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. (1)

At its core, open theism is a critique as classical theism. Its primary thrust is the emphasis on human freedom and dynamic relationship with God. Open theism argues that classical views fail to offer the coherent framework necessary to allow for genuine divine/human relationships. It asserts itself as a 'more biblical' worldview, offering a reconstruction of several classical divine attributes:

1. Omniscience - On open theism, God knows all that is possible to know. However, God cannot know the future, as comprehensive knowledge of the future would entail a fixity of events and preclude human free choice. Since the future is not yet a realty to be known, the open theist is still able to claim God is omniscient...the definition simply receives a new treatment.

   
   

2. Omnipotence - The open theist does not deny the omnipotence of God. Rather, she affirms God decides to cede some power to humans in order to provide a pathway toward free choice.

   
   

   For Pinnock, "The all-powerful God delegates power to the creature, making himself vulnerable. In giving us dominion over the earth, God shares power with the creature." (2)

   
   

   This delegation allows humanity to carve its own path, reaping both the pleasures and pains libertarian freedom entails.

   
   

3. Timelessness - A God who exists 'above the timeline' is able to see past, present, and future exhaustively. This is an obvious attribute to shed for the theist who wishes God to not possess a detailed blueprint of future events.

   
   

4. Immutability - For the open theist, God is unchanging in character, essence, and core attributes. But God is also deeply impacted by creation and moved by interactions with it. As such, God adjusts nimbly to human free choices. At times, God even changes a course initially set in motion (see Ex 32:14, Jeremian 26:19).

   
   

5. Impassibility - God is also not the stoic deity of classical theism in the open view. God is emotionally affected by human choice and even hurt by the experience of tragedy. The open theist points frequently to Jesus as a model here (see John 11:35, Luke 19:41-44).

Open Theism's Theodicy

Open theology appeals to its reframing of theism as the source of its improvements towards a compelling theodicy.

Certainly, a God who cedes power to humanity is less blameworthy for the decisions humans make. And if God does not foresee the future free choices of creation, then there is no blame to assign for not anticipating its evil actions.

Further, a God who is neither immutable nor impassible is One who can sympathize with our struggles, not standing ‘somewhere up there’ above the timeline, but entering into our struggles to be Companion, Healer, and Friend.

On open theism, God is responsible for setting up the conditions of the universe and omnibenevolence is much easier to affirm when providence does not precede partnership.

This framework is certainly appealing to many. However, is it both logical and livable?

The Two Theodicy Approaches Available

In his chapter of God and the Problem of Evil, William Hasker details two different approaches to the problem of pain. (3)

The first he calls a general-policy theodicy. This type of solution claims that God is morally justified in allowing evil to occur because any evil is simply the result of the system set up by God at the beginning of creation, which, overall, is good.

For example, occasional hurricanes may be the inevitable consequence of the overall climate system on the planet earth. On the whole, this regulatory framework allows for the flourishing of countless kinds of living creatures, including humanity. That some may die during a hurricane does not impugn God because it is better to have a system where there is life than no life at all.

And it is not just natural evils that may be accounted for in a general-policy theodicy. Moral evil receives a similar treatment. Murder, for example, is not something for which God can rightly receive blame. This is because God, being omnibenevolent, knows it is better to endow humanity with freedom of choice. That free will is used for evil purposes is simply the result of creation's scaffolding.

The second approach to the problem of pain, Hasker dubs specific-benefit theodicy. This type of theodicy takes into account each evil that occurs as a separate and unique circumstance. The hurricane's occurrence is not evaluated (at least in toto) as a necessary consequence of a general framework, but also looked at as an isolated event. Perhaps much needed precipitation was delivered to some droughted areas of Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina. However, the close to two-thousand deaths and $125 billion in damage might seem to outweigh any short-term benefit realized from the relief provided by the rain.

Moral evil is evaluated on similar grounds. Murder (to continue the above example) is not analyzed solely on the grounds of allowances made for free will. It is weighed, rather, against the people impacted by the specific situation.

Open Theodicy is Necessarily a General Policy Theodicy

Hasker observes that open theism provides for a general-policy theodicy. (4) It is logical to deduce that, on the whole, a framework of freedom is better than one of control...and that freedom to choose good necessarily entails that ability to choose evil. Similarly, the climate needed to sustain life on Earth may warrant the occurrence of occasional and outlying natural disasters.

Open theodicy may provide appeal beyond classical and Molinist responses to the problem of evil. This is because, as referenced above, God sets the framework, and any evil that occurs is simply a result of the ‘rules of the road.’ Further, the framework set by God does not include an exhaustively foreknown future. So, God does not receive blame for unforeseen circumstances.

But that which makes open theodicy appealing may be the very thing which deems it ultimately unlivable.

Evaluation Open Theism’s General Policy Theodicy

It is my (strong) contention that a satisfying theodicy cannot simply be a general-policy theodicy. Rather, it must be a specific-policy theodicy.

Little comfort is provided the one stricken with intractable illness when she is told her condition is a necessary entailment of the natural order of things.

Similarly, solace seems scare for the families of holocaust survivors by the presentation of a free-will defense.

The Achilles heel of open theodicy is its concession that God is always able to unilaterally intervene to alter the course of any event (even those things initially unforeseen by God but now knowable in the present). In fact, open thinkers affirm such omnipotence.

However, they are cautious to expect such power to be put to use. For Hasker, "Frequent and routine intervention by God to prevent the misuse of freedom by his creatures...would undermine the structure of human life...accordingly, such intervention should not be expected to occur." (5)

For the open theist, God can intervene to prevent evil but does so only selectively. The many questions that may be expected to follow from the mouths of those who are unfortunate enough to experience tragedy are not hard to anticipate:

"Why did God allow my friend's rape to occur if it could have been stopped?"

"Why did God heal that person's cancer and not my dad's?"

"Were the deaths that occurred when the plane went down really a necessary by-product of selective divine kenosis?"

In full disclosure, I spent over 25 years as an open theist. But it was my inability to live with open theism's approach to theodicy that eventually drove me away.

I do believe that open theism makes progress towards a successful theodicy when compared to that of classical theism and molinism. But I cannot escape that fact that the answer to the problem of evil does not ultimately change...no evil occurs unless God permits it.

Is a God who can stop evil but chooses not to truly omnibenevolent? It is hard to see how this can be so.

As such, open theodicy may be logical, but it is certainly not livable.

What's Next?

In my next post, I will share the theodicy that I have found to be both logical and livable. In doing so, I will review the thoughts of David Ray Griffin (and some of my own), in order to present the theodicy of process naturalism.

(1) Pinnock, Clark H., Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger. The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994.

(2) Pinnock, et al. 115.

(3) Hasker, William. “An Open Theist View.” In God and the Problem of Evil: Five Views, edited by Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2017, 57-76.

(4) Hasker, 62.

(5) Hasker, 74.