Bad Theodicy: Molinism and the Problem of Evil

In my new book, The Death of Supernaturalism: The Case for Process Naturalism, I detail the growing skepticism around belief in the existence of God. I make the case that atheism will continue to be seen as an attractive alternative to theism as long as the case for belief remains unadapted to modern objections. (1)

Perhaps no issue looms larger than that of the problem of evil. Indeed, evil is no less present, pernicious and perplexing in the modern world than it has ever been.

This blog series is an attempt to review and respond to many of the traditional theistic responses to the problem of evil.

But First, Let's Review

In sum, the typical formulation of the problem of evil goes something like this:

1. If God is omnibenevolent, then God desires to eliminate all evil.

   
   

2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.

   
   

3. Evils occur.

   
   

4. Therefore, God is not omnipotent, not omnibenevolent, or simply does not exist.

My aim is to evaluate each theodicy using two key criteria:

1. Is the response logical (consistent, valid, sound)?

2. Is the response livable (satisfying, applicable, practical)?

In my last post, I evaluated Philip Carey's classical theodicy, finding it logical, but far from livable.

Today, I will turn to the theodicy of molinism, represented most prolifically by William Lane Craig.

What is Molinism?

Molinism is a theological framework developed by 16th-century Jesuit philosopher Luis de Molina. The primary thrust of the system is to reconcile divine providence with human free will.

At molinism's core is the concept of middle knowledge. On molinism, middle knowledge is a unique category of divine knowledge that exists between God’s natural knowledge (everything that could happen) and God's free knowledge (everything that will happen).

Practically speaking, middle knowledge refers to God’s awareness of what any free creature will do given any hypothetical situation. (A fancy way of saying this is to affirm God knows 'all the counterfactuals of freedom.')

This middle knowledge allows God to sovereignly orchestrate the world’s events by actualizing a scenario in which creatures freely choose actions that align with divine purposes.

Effectively, for the molinist, God can control outcomes without violating human freedom.

Molinism offers a sophisticated (if not cumbersome) alternative to both strict determinism and open and relational theism when it comes to the relationship between God's providence and human agency.

Molinist Theodicy

You are perhaps already thinking to yourself what the above formulation of God's governance changes, or improves upon, compared to the classical response to the problem of evil.

In short, the molinist response is quite similar.

The reader may observe that molinism does a better job at preserving creaturely freedom than classical theism. But the fact remains that God still controls outcomes. Indeed, for Craig, "Everything that happens...occurs either by God's will or permission and thus falls under His providence." (2)

So, what (if anything) can the molinist add to theodicy that the classical theist cannot? Perhaps they can relieve God of some responsibility for the occurrence of evil by appealing to the concept of 'necessary collateral damage' (my words not Craig's).

For example, let's say God desires to create a world in which two things are guaranteed:

1. the actuality of creaturely freedom

2. the ultimate defeat of evil at the end of the age

God, knowing all possible worlds (including all possible outcomes from each created condition), decides to implement the very world we have. God does this knowing much undesirable evil will occur along the way. However, God uses middle knowledge to assure the best possible world is implemented in order to minimize this collateral damage, yet ultimately achieve God's intended purposes.

Evaluating Molinist Theodicy

On its face, molinism may appear to present a more convincing case for the omnibenevolence of God versus classical theism. The molinist might say, "We have no reason to question whether or not God has a morally sufficient reason to bring about a world in which the holocaust occurs, because we do not have the same grasp of counterfactuals God commands...Certainly, God could have created a world in which the holocaust doesn't occur, but who knows the purposes of God which may have been foiled along the way?"

For myself, I have difficulty seeing how molinism avoids being left with the same responses classical theism is forced into in formulating a theodicy:

1. Try to find the greater good for the evil which occurs.

   
   

2. When all else fails, appeal to mystery.

Craig seems to acknowledge this shortcoming by drawing on several historical examples of evils which have occurred, in order to demonstrate the greater good that resulted from them.

For example, Craig details the conversions to Christianity in Ethiopia over several recent decades:

"Ethiopia is in a state of shock. Her population struggles with the trauma of millions of deaths through repression, famine and war. Two great waves of violent persecution refined and purified the Church, but there were many martyrs. There have been millions coming to Christ. Protestants were fewer than 0.8% of the population in 1960, but by 1990 this may have become 13% of the population." (3)

Craig's case is laid out plainly. God permitted millions to die through repression, famine, war, for the greater good of a 12.2% net rise in the country's rate of Protestantism.

Even if is argued that the aim of God is humanity flourishing in relationship with the divine, and that Christianity provides the easiest path to achieve such an end, I remain skeptical that the millions who suffered and died in Ethiopia between 1960 and 1990 represent justifiable collateral damage for the 12.2% bump in stats Ethiopia experienced.

In the end, molinism seems no more livable than classical theism when it comes to assessing its theodicy.

Nor can I grant molinism provides a logical response to the problem of evil (at least as far as providing a sound accounting of reality). Among the myriad philosophical issues that can be raised against molinism, in general, I am concerned that the knowledge of counterfactuals actually provides a sound basis for predicting creaturely actions.

I may be prematurely tipping my process-oriented hand here, but it seems that freedom necessarily entails a lack of the predictability characteristic of the mechanistic input-output responses suggested within the molinist worldview.

In the End

Molinism may be even less satisfying than classical theism when it comes to responding to the problem of evil, as it is neither livable nor logical.

Fortunately, there are more options available. In my next post, I will be looking to the theodicy of open theism, and will be doing so through the lens of proponent William Hasker.

(1) Bahl, Chad. The Death of Supernaturalism: The Case for Process Naturalism. Foreword by Thomas Jay Oord. Newberg, OR: Quoir, 2025.

(2) Craig, William Lane. “A Molinist View.” In God and the Problem of Evil: Five Views, edited by Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2017, 40.

(3) Craig, 49.